The European Union has notified five Caribbean governments that they must close their Citizenship by Investment (CBI) programs by 2028. Regional Prime Ministers have agreed to travel to Brussels for discussions. This decision is the right one, but what they bring to those meetings will determine whether the Caribbean loses a vital revenue stream or gains a sustainable long‑term trade compact. Preparation will make all the difference.
By Fletcher St. Jean, MBA
St. Jean & Company
Last Friday in Roseau, Dominica, the Prime Ministers of Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines agreed to proceed to Brussels. They will seek meetings with the President of the European Commission, the President of the European Council, and the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. They have instructed their foreign ministers, ministers responsible for CBI, ambassadors, and senior officials to coordinate a unified regional position.
This is the correct course of action — but it marks only the beginning of the hard work, not the end. The outcome of those discussions will depend entirely on what the region brings to the negotiating table.
This analysis is offered in that spirit — not as commentary, but as guidance for preparation. The case the region must make is not merely about compliance, though that work is essential. It is a strategic case: one that reframes the conversation from defence to proposal, and presents concrete options so clear that the EU must choose to accept or reject them publicly before the international community.
What the Region Is Walking Into
We must be clear‑eyed about the landscape ahead. Commissioner Magnus Brunner’s letter dated June 25 states that operating a CBI program is now, in itself, grounds for reviewing Schengen visa‑free access — “regardless of how well it is managed.” Those four words are the most significant in the letter. The concern is no longer administrative; it is fundamental in principle.
The Eastern Caribbean Citizenship Investment Regulatory Authority (ECCIRA) — the region’s new unified CBI regulator, headquartered in Grenada and operational this year — was established specifically to address compliance concerns as thoroughly as possible. Yet the EU’s response makes clear that compliance is no longer the issue being raised.
This should bring clarity, not despair. The region should not enter Brussels arguing only that it has improved its programs — such an approach will meet a fixed position that will not shift. Instead, it should arrive ready to advocate for what a genuine partnership requires in return.
The Strongest Hand the Region Holds
The region’s most powerful argument is not a defence of CBI, but an explanation of the imbalance at stake. If these programs are phased out as the EU requests, the European Union and the United States achieve their stated goal of safeguarding their systems — but the Eastern Caribbean bears the full financial cost.
Dominica stands to lose revenue equivalent to roughly 37% of its GDP. St. Kitts and Nevis, whose fiscal deficit widened to approximately 11% of GDP in 2024 as CBI earnings declined, faces a structural funding gap with no ready replacement. Five small nations will lose the financing used to build hospitals, airports, climate‑resilient housing, and fiscal buffers. Under this scenario, the EU gains, while the Caribbean pays. That is not a fair partnership outcome. Stating this plainly and calmly — without hostility — is the first point the region should make.
The second step is to put forward a clear request — not for compensation, which would place the region in a supplicant’s position, but for expanded trade access. The frameworks already exist: the CARIFORUM‑EU Economic Partnership Agreement, the Samoa Agreement, and the EU’s Global Gateway initiative. What is needed is to turn these agreements into tangible, binding commitments that match the region’s capacity to deliver.
Guaranteed, long‑term market access for Caribbean agricultural produce and value‑added goods — paired with EU support for the infrastructure required to meet international standards — creates a settlement both sides can justify publicly. The EU strengthens its development partnership, while the Caribbean trades a temporary revenue stream for a permanent economic foundation. This is negotiation, not surrender.
What to Put on the Table
The region must arrive with a specific, detailed proposal. It should include these core elements:
• A phased transition framework, not an abrupt cutoff
A hard stop in June 2028 with no alternative plan is not a transition — it is a fiscal crisis. Instead, the region should propose a structured, negotiated wind‑down, moving toward residency and investment models that meet EU safeguards while allowing an orderly flow of capital during the adjustment period. A timeline of three to five years, with clear milestones, is a reasonable request.
• Binding agricultural trade access
European trade preferences once sustained the Windward Islands banana industry. When those preferences were removed, the region saw how quickly an economy dependent on external policy decisions can decline. We should not repeat that experience — we should use it. A firm, guaranteed commitment to expanded access for Caribbean agricultural and processed goods — with defined volumes and timelines — must form the centre of the new economic partnership.
• A Caribbean Development Partnership Facility
The EU’s Global Gateway already focuses on cooperation and infrastructure investment. The region should request a dedicated facility under this framework, with initial funding from the EU and matching contributions from the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) and Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB). Funding should target the infrastructure most needed to support trade: cold storage facilities, packing plants, port upgrades, and phytosanitary certification systems. In short, the EU helps open the door, and the region builds the capacity to deliver through it.
• Climate resilience co‑financing
Small island developing states face a disproportionate burden from climate change, despite contributing the least to its causes. The Roseau meeting identified climate resilience as a key topic; it must be included in the agreement as a specific, quantified commitment, not just a general statement of intent.
How to Approach the Negotiations
Three aspects of posture matter as much as the content of the proposal:
• Speak with one voice
The unified position agreed in Roseau is not optional — it is the foundation of any effective negotiation. Five separate discussions would give Brussels five opportunities to divide the region. A single mandate, one set of proposals, and a unified delegation carries real weight. The OECS Chairman, Prime Minister Gaston Browne, and incoming CARICOM Chairman, Prime Minister Philip J. Pierre, should lead together, making clear that this is not a sub‑regional concern but a Caribbean‑wide priority.
• Bring the data
Every part of the proposal must be supported by figures: the fiscal impact of an immediate cutoff, the amount of revenue to be replaced, the investment the region is prepared to make, and the specific volumes of goods it seeks to export. Precision demonstrates seriousness; vagueness allows agreements in principle without concrete results — something the region has experienced before.
• Acknowledge the broader context — calmly, not as grievance
The decline of the banana industry, the pressure on financial services in the late 1990s, and the loss of correspondent banking relationships are not isolated events, but part of a recurring pattern. Naming this history provides context for why the region now seeks binding commitments rather than promises of intent. A partner that has seen solidarity give way to external interests in the past is right to ask for enforceable terms this time.
The Window Is Open — Now Build the Plan
The CDB’s Decade of Decision estimates that the region will need around US$65 billion in financing by 2033 just to avoid economic stagnation. The ECCB’s Big Push strategy calls for doubling the Eastern Caribbean’s economic output within ten years. Both plans assume the region can attract investment and sustain public spending. An unplanned fiscal collapse would make these goals impossible; a negotiated agreement — with trade access, a phased transition, development funding, and infrastructure support — makes them achievable.
What is needed most is a plan — not just a statement or communiqué, but a detailed, costed, legally sound strategy for economic transition. It must clearly outline what revenue will be replaced, which industries will be developed, what trade volumes will be negotiated, what infrastructure will be funded, and the timeline for all these actions. The Caribbean has faced forced transitions before, but rarely with a roadmap prepared in advance, supported by data, before the change takes effect.
St. Jean & Company has already begun this work. The transition and diversification framework we have developed since 2020 — aligned with the CDB and ECCB strategies — was designed specifically for this moment. It provides the analytical foundation to approach Brussels with facts, not emotion; with proposals, not appeals; and with a clear vision of where the region is going, not just a defence of where it has been. This work is available to support the negotiating team, and the firm stands ready to provide full advisory services as needed.
The meeting in Roseau was the right call, taken quickly. This is how the Caribbean has always responded: adapting when circumstances shift. The difference now is that the ground has not yet given way, and there is still time to choose the path forward. That opportunity will not last forever. This is the time for preparation — let us use it well.
Author’s Note
St. Jean & Company has been developing a transition and diversification framework for the Eastern Caribbean since 2020, aligned with the CDB’s Decade of Decision and the ECCB’s Big Push strategy. The firm advises regional institutions and investors on economic strategy and transition planning, and is available to support the preparation work required for the Brussels mission.
